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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
James R. Bullock, John R. Grainger, and Leslie W. 
Haworth (each a "Canadian Director," collectively the 
"Canadian Directors")1 are among a number of former officers 
and directors of Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. (and 
its successor entity, Safety-Kleen Corporation) who were 
sued in Utah state court by Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs"). The 
Canadian Directors, in addition to the other individual 
defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. (RA 041).2 After full briefing and 
oral arguments by the parties, the Third District Court of 
Utah dismissed the complaint against each of the 
Defendants-Appellees ("Defendants"). (RA 0578, p. 22; RA 
0553-0554). 
The Third District Court certified the dismissal 
for lack of personal jurisdiction as a final judgment under 
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on August 
1
 James R. Bullock, Leslie W. Haworth and John R. 
Granger are Canadian citizens. As all prior filings in 
this case have referred to these individual defendants as 
the "Canadian Directors," this brief will continue to use 
that term as a matter of consistency. 
2 "RA" refers to the Record on Appeal, as paginated by 
the Clerk of the Court. 
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i 
6, 2002. (RA 0555-0556). Consequently, the Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code i 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW < 
Plaintiffs misstate the issues presented by this 
appeal in their opening brief. The issue presented for 
review is not whether a Utah court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over "officers and directors who in person or 
through an agent transact business" in Utah. Plaintiff-
Appellants' Brief (hereafter "App. Br."), p. 2. That non-
controversial proposition has no application in this case. 
Indeed, the trial court granted Defendants' motions to 
dismiss precisely because the Plaintiffs failed to make a 
single supportable allegation that any of the three 
Canadian Directors participated in the transaction at 
issue, either personally or through an agent, nor do 
Plaintiffs allege that the Canadian Directors have any 
other jurisdictional contacts with the State of Utah. 
The true issues presented for review are as 
follows: (1) whether a Utah court may properly exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident director 
based on presumptive statutory liability, despite the fact 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the director has not transacted any business in Utah 
either personally or through an agent and has no other 
contacts with Utah; and (2) whether Utah Code Annotated 
Section 61-1-26, which provides for substituted service of 
process, provides an independent basis for personal 
jurisdiction without regard to Due Process considerations. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint against 
the Canadian Directors due to a lack of personal 
jurisdiction. This determination is reviewed for 
"correctness." See Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). In reviewing 
the decision of the trial court, the facts asserted in 
Defendants' affidavits are taken to be true, unless 
controverted. Id. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Procedural History 
This litigation is but one episode in a series of 
protracted lawsuits arising from a purported accounting 
fraud alleged to have been perpetrated at Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, Inc. ("LES") (now, after a 1998 
merger, known as Safety-Kleen Corporation ("Safety-
Kleen")). (RA 011-017). In addition to the instant 
3 
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i 
litigation, there are four coordinated federal lawsuits 
currently pending in the United States District Court, 
District of South Carolina, the jurisdiction where LES had 
its principal place of business and where its board of 
directors met.3 Further, a lawsuit in the State of 
California, which is substantially similar to the present 
lawsuit, was previously dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction for precisely the same reasons that the Utah 
trial court dismissed this case against Defendants. See 
Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc. et al. v. Winger, et al., in 
the Superior court of Sacramento County, California, Docket 
No. 01 AS 01376 (hereafter "Eaton Vance"); (RA 0582-0606; 
053-055) .4 
3
 See In re Safety-Kleen Bondholders Litigation, 3:00-CV-
1145-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); In re Safety-Kleen Shareholder 
Litigation, 3:00-CV-736-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); and In re: 
Laidlaw Stockholder Litigation, 3:00-CV-855-17 (D.S.C.) 
(Anderson, J.); In re Safety-Kleen Rollins Shareholder 
Litigation, 3:00-CV-1343-17 (Anderson, J.). 
4
 In March of 2003, the California Court of Appeal, 
Third Appellate District affirmed the dismissal for lack of 
personal jurisdiction in an unpublished opinion (not to be 
cited or relied on, pursuant to California Rule of Court, 
Rule 977(a)). The Plaintiffs in that case have sought to 
further appeal the dismissal to the California Supreme 
Court. 
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In the California Eaton Vance case, four 
plaintiffs, three of whom are also plaintiffs in the 
instant case, brought a lawsuit against the same group of 
defendants as in this case. In addition to the identity of 
parties, the jurisdictional issues in the California suit 
are virtually identical to those in the present case; in 
both California and Utah the Plaintiffs argued that 
specific personal jurisdiction may be based on state 
statutes providing for control person liability for 
securities fraud. See California Corporations Code Section 
25540; Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) (hereafter "Section 61-
1-22(4)"); (RA 0591-0599). Indeed, Plaintiffs admit in 
their brief before this Court that the California statute 
is "worded virtually identically" to Section 61-1-22(4). 
App. Br., p. 23. As noted above, the Superior Court of 
Sacramento County, California dismissed the California 
lawsuit on October 26, 2001, and that decision has since 
been affirmed on appeal. (RA 053-055; fn. 4 supra). 
In the present case, Plaintiffs (ten East-Coast 
institutional investment firms) allege that they were 
defrauded on July 1, 1997, when they purchased bonds (the 
"Bonds") issued by Tooele County, Utah and secured by LES. 
5 
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I 
See Complaint, RA 01-023. The plaintiffs have sued three 
senior LES officers and every person who served as a I 
director on the LES Board at the time the Bonds were 
issued. (RA 018-020, 023) . Plaintiffs contend that they 
were fraudulently induced to purchase bonds through 
misleading offering materials. (RA 002-010). 
James R. Bullock, John R. Grainger, and Leslie W. 
Haworth were among the directors who served on the Board of 
LES at the time the Bonds were issued. (Affidavits of 
i 
Canadian Directors, RA 042, 046, 050-051) . It is 
undisputed that none of these Canadian Directors 
participated in the issuance of the Bonds, drafted any of 
the offering materials for the bonds, or marketed the 
Bonds. (RA 042, 045, 050). The Canadian Directors no 
longer serve on the board of LES or its successor-entity, 
Safety-Kleen. (RA 042, 046, 050). 
On July 1, 2001, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in 
the Third District Court of Utah, asserting a claim against 
thirteen individuals who at various times served as 
officers or directors of LES and Safety-Kleen. (RA 01-
023) . In response to this lawsuit, the Canadian Directors 
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
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personal jurisdiction. (RA 040-041). The Canadian 
Directors submitted sworn declarations in support of their 
motion stating, inter alia, that they are Canadian 
citizens, that they had and have no contacts with Utah, and 
that they did not "market the Bonds to prospective 
investors or draft the offering materials for the Bonds." 
(RA 041-043, 049-051, 045-047). Importantly, none of these 
sworn declarations were rebutted by plaintiffs, and 
therefore must be taken to be true. See Arguello, 838 P.2d 
at 1121. 
After a full hearing, the trial court dismissed 
the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction on June 19, 
2002. (RA 0553-0554). The court rejected the Plaintiffs' 
argument that an assertion of liability under Section 61-1-
22(4) -- which provides that persons who "control" an 
entity found to have violated Utah's securities laws may be 
held liable for acts of the controlled entity — is 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). Plaintiffs now 
appeal this decision. 
7 
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I 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Plaintiffs' statement of facts neglects to mention ( 
a number of material facts. For that reason, the Canadian 
Directors hereby provide a statement of relevant facts as 
i 
follows: 
1. The Canadian Directors (a) did not participate 
in the issuance of the bonds; (b) did not draft the { 
offering materials for the bonds; and (c) did not market 
the bonds to the Plaintiffs or anyone else. (RA 042, 045, 
i 
050) . 
2. None of the Canadian Directors has ever had 
any significant contacts with Utah. The Canadian Directors 
have never lived in Utah, paid taxes in Utah, owned 
property in Utah, nor had any contractual obligations with 
any Utah resident. (RA 042, 046, 050). 
3. Defendants John R. Grainger, James R. Bullock, 
and Leslie W. Haworth are Canadian citizens, residing in 
the Toronto area of Canada when this lawsuit was filed. 
(RA 043, 047, 051) . 
5
 Leslie Haworth is also a citizen of the U.K. (RA 043). 
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4 . The Canadian Directors are former outside 
directors of LES, the corporate entity that purportedly 
secured the bonds purchased by the Plaintiffs. (RA 042, 
046, 050). 
5. The ten Plaintiffs, MFS Series Trust III (on 
behalf of MFS Municipal High Income Fund), Merrill Lynch 
High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., MuniHoldings Fund, 
Inc., Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, The National 
Portfolio, Merrill Lynch Municipal Strategy Fund, Eaton 
Vance Distributors, Inc., T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc., 
John Hancock Funds, Inc., and Putnam Investments, Inc., are 
institutional purchasers of the bonds. None of the 
Plaintiffs reside in Utah. (RA 021) . MFS Municipal High 
Income Fund is a series of MFS Series Trust III, which is a 
Massachusetts business trust with its principal offices in 
Boston. Id. Merrill Lynch High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, 
Inc., MuniHoldings Fund, Inc., Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond 
Fund, The National Portfolio, and Merrill Lynch Municipal 
Strategy Fund are incorporated in Maryland and managed by 
an entity based in New Jersey. Id. Eaton Vance 
Distributors, Inc. and Putnam Investments, Inc. are each 
incorporated in Massachusetts and have principal places of 
9 
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i 
business in Boston. Id. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. is 
a Maryland Corporation with its principal place of business < 
in Baltimore. Id. Finally, John Hancock Funds, Inc. is a 
Delaware corporation which also has its principal place of 
i 
business in Boston. Id. 
6. Safety-Kleen is a Delaware corporation with 
its principal place of business in South Carolina. (RA 
021, 0178) . The predecessor-entity, LES, was a subsidiary 
of Laidlaw Inc. (RA 046, 020). LES also had its principal 
place of business in South Carolina. (RA 0110). 
7. On January 22, 2002, the Canadian defendants 
and others moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. (RA 041). In their court papers, 
the Canadian defendants argued that they were not subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Utah and did not have the 
requisite minimum contacts with this State. (See, e.g., RA 
085-091) . 
8. There are four class action securities 
lawsuits pending in the federal district court in South 
Carolina against the same group of defendants arising out 
of the same accounting matters at issue in the Plaintiffs' 
complaint. (See In re Safety-Kleen Bondholders Litigation, 
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3:00-CV-1145-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); In re Safety-Kleen 
Shareholder Litigation, 3:00-CV-736-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); 
and In re: Laidlaw Stockholder Litigation, 3:00-CV-855-17 
(D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.)/ In re Safety-Kleen Rollins Shareholder 
Litigation, 3:00-CV-1343-17 (Anderson, J.). In addition, a 
separate, substantively identical lawsuit filed in 
California was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction 
on October 26, 2001 (RA 053-055), and that decision has now 
been affirmed on appeal. See fn.4 supra. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In order for a Utah court to exercise specific 
personal jurisdiction over the Canadian Directors, 
Plaintiffs must make a showing that each defendant has 
engaged in conduct enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute. 
See, e.g., Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo 
Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 612-613 (D. Utah 1995). 
Plaintiffs must further satisfy the two requirements of the 
Due Process Clause by establishing: (1) that defendants 
have "minimum contacts'' with the forum state; and (2) that 
the exercise of jurisdiction over each defendant is fair 
and reasonable. Id. Moreover, the Court must assess each 
defendant individually with respect to these jurisdictional 
11 
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cons idera t ions , without regard to whether jurisdiction over 
the corporation with which they are associated is proper. i 
See Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service 
Corp., 810 F .2d 1518, 1524 (10 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) . 
i 
The Canadian Directors have no relevant contacts 
with the State of Utah, nor did they did participate in the 
bond offering, issuance, or marketing, whether personally ( 
or through an agent. In an attempt to avoid these 
dispositive facts, Plaintiffs misconstrue two Utah statutes 
as somehow exponentially expanding the personal 
jurisdictional reach of Utah. Plaintiffs' position is 
plainly without merit. Section 61-1-22(4) is a liability 
statute that confers "control person" liability with 
respect to securities fraud. Because liability and 
jurisdiction are independent inquiries, Section 61-1-22(4) 
has no impact on the determination of personal 
jurisdiction. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th 
Cir. 1990). Similarly, Section 61-1-26 has no relevance to 
the question of personal jurisdiction. Section 61-1-26 
provides solely for substituted service of process for 
violations of Utah securities law where a basis of personal 
jurisdiction is already established. 
1 O 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that these statutes were 
somehow relevant to analysis here, personal jurisdiction 
over the Canadian Directors is still improper because such 
an exercise of jurisdiction would offend due process since 
the Canadian Directors clearly lack the requisite "minimum 
contacts'' with Utah. Furthermore, considering the burden 
on the Canadian Directors of defending this lawsuit in 
Utah, the slight interest of Utah in this litigation, and 
the interests of judicial economy, exercising personal 
jurisdiction in this case would also be constitutionally 
unreasonable. The trial court correctly determined that 
the complaint against the Canadian Directors should be 
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and this 
dismissal should be affirmed. 
V. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that Utah has specific 
(as opposed to general) personal jurisdiction over the 
Canadian Directors.6 See, e.g., App. Br., p. 14. Under 
Plaintiffs apparently concede, as they must, that 
general jurisdiction does not exist for any of the Canadian 
Directors. The Canadian Directors did not have continuous 
and systematic contacts with Utah that would justify the 
exercise of general jurisdiction. See Burger King v. 
13 
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i 
Utah law, any claim of specific jurisdiction must satisfy a 
three part inquiry: i 
(1) the defendant's acts or contacts must 
implicate Utah under the Utah long-arm 
statute; (2) a "nexus" must exist between the 
plaintiff's claims and the defendant's acts or * 
contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long 
arm statute must satisfy the requirements of 
federal due process. 
Harnischfeger, 883 F. Supp. at 612-613 (D. Utah 1995) . { 
Therefore, in order to justify specific personal 
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must not only show that the 
defendants have engaged in conduct enumerated in the Utah 
long-arm statute, but Plaintiffs must also establish that 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with 
Constitutional Due Process. DeMoss v. City Market, Inc., 
762 F. Supp. 913, 916 (D. Utah 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-24; United States Constitution, Amdt. 14. 
Due process permits the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction only when two criteria are satisfied: (1) the 
defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts'7 with the forum 
state; and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is 
"reasonable" such that jurisdiction does "'not offend 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); (Affidavits of Canadian 
Directors, RA 042, 045-46, 050-51). 
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traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 
Harnischfeger, 883 F. Supp. at 614 (quoting International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
Furthermore, "[e]ach defendant's contacts with the forum 
state must be assessed individually." Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 790 (1984). Plaintiffs thus bear the burden of 
showing that each of the Canadian Directors has "minimum 
contacts'' with Utah as individuals, apart from their mere 
roles as directors of LES. Id. at 790; Patriot Systems, 
Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1320 (D. Utah 
1998) ("[Wjhen the court's jurisdiction is contested, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction exists7') 
(citations omitted). As discussed below, Plaintiffs failed 
to plead that the Canadian defendants have any contacts 
with Utah, much less that each of them took actions 
directed at Utah that could give rise to the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction in this case. For all the reasons 
discussed herein, the trial court's order of dismissal 
should be affirmed. 
15 
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< 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That The 
Canadian Defendants Do Not Have The Requisite 
Minimum Contacts With Utah. ( 
A finding of "minimum contacts'7 must be based on 
"some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
[him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958); Harnischfeger, 883 F.Supp. at 614. To meet this { 
"purposeful availment'' requirement, plaintiffs must show 
that each of the Canadian Directors "^deliberately' has 
engaged in significant activities within a State or has 
created ^continuing obligations' between himself and 
residents of the forum.'' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (citations omitted); see also 
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of , 
California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (to 
establish purposeful availment the plaintiff must show "an 
action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State") (emphasis in original). Furthermore, the 
defendant's alleged conduct must be causally linked to the 
claims stated in the complaint at issue. Roskelley v. 
Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980) (claims must 
"arise out of" defendants contacts with forum state). 
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Plaintiffs cannot establish minimum contacts between 
any of the Canadian Directors and the State of Utah because the 
Canadian Directors have not engaged in any conduct with respect 
to the Bonds at issue in this case. The Canadian defendants did 
not participate in the issuance of the Bonds. (RA 042, 045, 
042) . They did not draft offering materials for the bonds, nor 
did they market the Bonds to prospective investors. Id. 
Furthermore, the Canadian Directors have never resided in Utah 
nor had any contractual obligations with any Utah resident. Id. 
These facts, as asserted in the affidavits of the Canadian 
Directors, are uncontroverted and must be accepted as true. 
Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1121 (since plaintiff failed to controvert 
affidavit, "the facts asserted in the affidavit are taken as 
true"). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim of specific jurisdiction 
fails on its face. 
In light of these determinative facts, Plaintiffs 
attempt to evade an individualized analysis of minimum contacts 
altogether. Instead of asserting that the Canadian Directors 
personally undertook actions that were directed at Utah 
something the Plaintiffs cannot do -- Plaintiffs seek to satisfy 
the requisite "minimum contacts" solely by virtue of the fact 
that the Canadian defendants served as directors of LES. 
Indeed, there can be no doubt that this is what Plaintiffs seek 
17 
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i 
to do, as admitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel when questioned by 
the trial court: 
Trial Court: So you're saying that the very 
fact that [defendants] were 
directors of a corporation that 
issued these bonds is sufficient 
to establish long-arm 
jurisdiction . . .? 
Plaintiffs' Counsel: That's exactly what I'm saying. 
RA 0578, p. 17. See also, e.g., App. Br. p. 29) (citing 
Seagate Technology v. A.J. Kogyo Co., 219 Cal.App.3d 696, 
703-704 (1990)).7 Plaintiffs' approach is not merely 
legally misguided, it is constitutionally impermissible. 
"Jurisdiction over the representatives of a corporation may 
not be predicated on the jurisdiction over the corporation 
itself, and jurisdiction over the individual officers and 
directors must be based on their individual contacts with 
the forum state." Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western 
Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1987); 
7
 Plaintiffs' reliance on the California case Seagate 
Technology v. A.J. Kogyo Co. is misleading. The Seagate 
Technology Court ruled that to establish jurisdiction, the 
action taken by a corporate officer "must in fact create 
contact between the officer and the forum state. (For 
example, no personal contact would result from doing 
nothing more than ratifying an act taken by the corporation 
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see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 
(1984) ("jurisdiction over an employee does not 
automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation 
which employs him"); Wegerer v. First Commodity Corp., 744 
F.2d 719, 727 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Jurisdiction over the 
individual officers of a corporation, however, may not be 
obtained merely by accomplishing jurisdiction over the 
corporation"). 
This Court has expressly held that it is necessary 
to distinguish between a corporation and its officers in 
assessing whether "minimum contacts" exist. For example, 
in SII Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 
this Court found that the defendant corporation, American 
Superabrasives Corp., had engaged in conduct sufficient to 
meet the requirements of "minimum contacts." 969 P.2d 430, 
436 (Utah 1998) . The officers of the corporation, on the 
other hand, had no such contacts with the state of Utah, 
thereby precluding the exercise of specific personal 
jurisdiction over the officers because "[m]inimum contacts 
must be found as to each defendant over whom the court 
exercises jurisdiction." Id. at 437 (quoting Home-Stake 
Prod. v. Talon Petroleum, 907 F.2d 1012, 1020 (10th 
1Q 
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i 
Cir.1990)). The Court noted that "specific personal 
jurisdiction arises only out of the actual transactions < 
between the defendant and the forum.'' SI I Megadiamond, 
Inc., 969 P.2d at 437. In the instant case, the Canadian 
Directors have engaged in no "actual transactions" in the 
State of Utah, thus precluding a finding of personal 
jurisdiction over these individuals. 
Similarly, in Ten Mile Industrial Park, the Tenth 
Circuit was faced with a situation closely analogous to the 
present case. The plaintiffs there sought to exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction over the members of the 
executive committee of a company on the basis that personal 
jurisdiction over the corporation was proper and the 
executive committee "had the ability to control the , 
activities" of the corporation. 810 F.2d at 1526. The 
Court rejected this argument, finding that the individual 
defendants lacked sufficient contacts with Utah, 
particularly where the plaintiffs "offered only conclusory 
allegations which [were] unsupported by affidavit or other 
competent evidence." Id. at 1527. Plaintiffs in the case 
at bar, like the plaintiffs in Ten Mile Industrial Park, 
have offered nothing more than "conclusory allegations" 
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that the Canadian Directors had any contacts with Utah — 
allegations which have been completely controverted by the 
directors' unrebutted affidavits. (RA 041-043, 045-047, 
049-051). This is patently insufficient to support a claim 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' attempts to distinguish SII 
Megadiamond and Ten Mile Industrial Park are without merit. 
The fact that these cases did not address a statute 
identical to Section 61-1-22(4) is irrelevant; due process 
requirements apply to every determination of personal 
jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction is based on a 
specific statute. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 
212 (1977) ("all assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in 
International Shoe and its progeny") ; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-22 (Utah long-arm statute applies only to the extent 
of due process). 
The complaint makes no allegations suggesting that 
the Canadian Directors had any contact with Utah beyond 
that derived solely from their official position with the 
corporation. To the contrary, the complaint does nothing 
more than make vague, collective references to the thirteen 
21 
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defendants as a group. (See, e.g., App. Br., pp. 29, 31). 
These allegations fail to demonstrate that the court has 
personal jurisdiction over the Canadian Directors. Because 
the Plaintiffs did not (and cannot) demonstrate that the 
Canadian defendants have the requisite minimum contacts 
with Utah, the trial court's ruling must be affirmed. 
B. Section 61-1-22(4) of the Utah Code Does Not 
Eliminate the Constitutional Minimum Contacts 
Requirement. 
In their attempt to escape the inexorable 
conclusion that the Canadian Directors do not have the 
requisite minimum contacts with Utah for purposes of due 
process, Plaintiffs next claim that Section 61-1-22(4) of 
the Utah Annotated Code provides them with an alternative 
basis for jurisdiction. See, e.g., App. Br., pp. 11-12. 
Section 61-1-22(4), however, is a liability statute which 
provides that a person who "controls a seller or buyer 
liable [for securities fraud]'7 is presumed to be jointly 
and severally liable with the controlled person or entity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). According to Plaintiffs, an 
allegation of liability under Section 61-1-22(4) is, ipso 
facto, sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over 
the Canadian defendants. This is plainly incorrect. No 
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Utah court has ever ruled that an allegation of liability 
under Section 61-1-22(4) is alone sufficient to confer 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, nor is 
this assertion consistent with the requirements of 
constitutional due process. This Court should decline the 
Plaintiffs' invitation to rewrite the law to suit their 
purposes. 
1. The Plaintiffs Improperly Conflate Liability 
With Personal Jurisdiction and Ignore Due 
Process Requirements. 
Rather than attempting to make a jurisdictional 
showing, Plaintiffs focus much of their brief erroneously 
equating liability to jurisdiction. See App. Br., pp. 18-
28. Plaintiffs' argument, however, ignores the well-
established principle that " [1]lability and jurisdiction 
are independent. Liability depends upon the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the defendants and between 
individual defendants. Jurisdiction depends only upon each 
defendant's relationship with the forum." Sher v. Johnson, 
911 F.2d at 1365 (emphasis added). Jurisdiction over the 
Canadian Defendants cannot stand solely on Plaintiffs' 
allegations of liability. See Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc., 610 P.2d at 1309 ("it is the jurisdictional facts, 
71 
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and not whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, which concern us here"); cf. Patriot 
Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F.Supp.2d at 1321 (the 
mere allegation that the defendant has caused tortuous 
injury within the state does not necessarily establish that 
the defendant possesses the constitutionally required 
minimum contacts) . Plaintiffs have not - and cannot - cite 
any authority to the contrary. 
Even when liability is presumed to arise from a 
defendant's position as a "controlling person," courts have 
steadfastly (and rightfully) demanded that the requirements 
of due process be satisfied. See Schlatter v. Mo-Comm 
Futures Ltd. 662 P.2d 553 (Kan. 1983) (hereafter 
Schlatter) ; see also Central States, Southeast and 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 
230 F.3d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 
934 (2001) (holding that a federal statute that imposes 
joint and several liability for businesses under common 
control is an insufficient basis for asserting personal 
jurisdiction); Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., 217 
Cal.App.3d 103, 114 (1990) (in lawsuit alleging violations 
of California's controlling person statute, which is 
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virtually identical to Utah's Section 61-1-22(4), court 
quashed the service of summons issued against individual 
defendants because of lack of "evidence that [the 
defendants] participated in or directed any tortious act or 
omission."). Further, as noted above, the California trial 
court rejected the same "control person liability" argument 
in the Eaton Vance case against the same group of 
defendants. (RA 0578, 0553-0554). 
Indeed, as the Plaintiffs recognize in their 
brief, the Kansas Supreme Court has also rejected this 
"liability" theory of jurisdiction. (App. Br., pp. 35-37); 
Schlatter, 662 P.2d 553. In Schlatter, the court held that 
a control person statute "establishes the basis for 
liability of persons involved ... but it does not establish 
the jurisdiction of the court to submit such persons to 
liability." Id. at 563 (citation omitted). The court 
ruled that it did not have personal jurisdiction because 
the plaintiff had not shown the existence of "any act, 
action or activity by either defendant ... which would meet 
the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy federal 
constitutional due process requirements." Id. 
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The Plaintiffs' tortured attempt to distinguish 
Schlatter is entirely unavailing. The Schlatter court --
like all other courts to address the issue -- held that, 
regardless of statutory liability, jurisdiction must be 
established in accordance with Constitutional Due Process. 
Id. Statutory semantics cannot trump the mandate of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; thus, the slight differences between 
the Kansas "control person" statute and the Utah statute 
are inconsequential. Plaintiffs also complain that the 
Schlatter case was decided in the context of a motion for 
summary judgment as opposed to a motion to dismiss the 
complaint. (App. Br., p. 39). However, Plaintiffs cite no 
authority indicating that constitutional principles differ 
depending upon the stage of the litigation where the 
jurisdictional challenge is made, nor does such a 
distinction make sense with respect to resolving a question 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs' notion of "automatic jurisdiction" 
under Section 61-1-22(4) simply cannot be reconciled with 
the "minimum contacts" requirement of the United States 
Constitution and prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Utah law is clear that a plaintiff must establish that each 
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defendant has minimum contacts with Utah before haling a 
defendant into this forum. See, e.g., Harnischfeger, 883 
F. Supp. at 612; SII Megadiamond, 969 P. 2d at 437; Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (Utah long-arm statute is explicit 
that state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction only 
to the "extent permitted by the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution."). Even 
if the Utah legislature explicitly wished to expand the 
reach of Utah's personal jurisdiction, it could not evade 
the requirements of constitutional due process. "Personal 
jurisdiction has constitutional dimensions, and regardless 
of policy goals, [the legislature] cannot override the due 
process clause, the source of protection for non-resident 
defendants." American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie 
Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996). "Each 
individual has a liberty interest in not being subject to 
the judgments of a forum with which he or she has 
established no meaningful ^contacts, ties or relations.'" 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 471 U.S. at 471-472 
(citations omitted). Plaintiffs have failed to show 
minimum contacts in this case; thus, regardless of any 
claimed statutory authority, an assertion of personal 
07 
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jurisdiction over the individual Canadian Defendants is 
constitutionally improper. 
2. The Out-of-State Authorities Cited by 
Plaintiffs Are Distinguishable And Do Not 
Abrogate The Constitutional Minimum Contacts 
Test. 
Plaintiffs cite a handful of federal cases to 
support the notion that liability may justify an exercise 
of personal jurisdiction. See App. Br., pp. 26, 43-45, 
citing: McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 
628, 640 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand 
Chartered Accountants, 930 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (D.N.J. 
1996) ; Landry v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 
715 F. Supp. 98, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); San Mateo County 
Trans. Dist. v. Dearman, Fitzgerald & Roberts Inc., 979 
F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs' reliance on these 
cases -- which involve claims brought under Section 20(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 — is entirely 
misplaced. 
As an initial matter, the McNamara court noted 
that because the federal Securities Exchange Act confers 
"nationwide service'7 of process, it could evaluate the 
exercise of jurisdiction under a "national contacts" 
standard. See McNamara, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 633, 641; see 
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also San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1358 (noting that the "court 
may have jurisdiction wherever [the defendant] might be 
found") . In contrast, the Plaintiffs in this case were 
required to show that each Canadian defendant had minimum 
contacts with Utah - something they have not, and cannot 
do. 
Moreover, in the four federal cases cited by 
Plaintiffs, the findings of personal jurisdiction were 
based not merely on allegations of liability, but rather on 
specific, supported allegations that the defendants had 
personally engaged in wrong-doing. For example, in 
McNamara, the insider defendants had participated in 
specific unlawful activities, including the promotion of 
the investment in question, the execution of fraudulent 
documents, and preparation of false press releases. 
McNamara, supra, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 640/ see also Derensis, 
supra, 930 F. Supp. at 1014 (defendants personally approved 
and disseminated the statements at issue and knew that 
those statements would influence the price of securities); 
Landry, 715 F. Supp. at 102 (factual allegations sufficient 
to indicate that attorney was intimately involved in the 
pertinent transactions). 
?Q 
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In San Mateo, the Court determined that there was 
a "colorable showing" that a brokerage firm7s vice 
president and treasurer might be liable as a controlling 
person under federal law because the defendant was alleged 
to have been personally involved in the bond trades at 
issue. San Mateo, supra, 979 F.2d at 1357.8 The facts of 
this case stand in stark contrast; here, the Canadian 
defendants did not participate in the bond transactions at 
issue, did not prepare offering materials for the bonds, 
did not have any contacts with the Plaintiffs, and did not 
market the bonds to investors. (RA 042, 045-046, 050-051). 
Thus, unlike the federal cases cited by Plaintiffs, minimum 
contacts are completely lacking in the case at bar. 
3. Plaintiffs' Novel Attempt to Shift the 
Burden of Proof Concerning the Existence 
of Jurisdictional Contacts Lacks Any 
Merit. 
It is well-established that Plaintiffs bear the 
burden of showing that each defendant has the requisite 
minimum contacts with Utah. "In a motion to dismiss for 
8
 The San Mateo decision has also been described as 
"utterly inconsistent" with longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent on personal jurisdiction. In re Baan Co. 
Securities Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79-82 (D.D.C. 
2000) . 
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lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of establishing that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant is proper.'7 Haas v. A.M. 
King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 647 (D. Utah 1998) 
(emphasis added).9 In an attempt to avoid this burden, 
Plaintiffs proffer yet another legal proposition that has 
never been adopted by this or any other Utah court, namely 
that the assertion of control person liability under 
Section 61-1-22(4) somehow shifts the burden of proof to 
the defendants to disprove liability in order to show a 
lack of jurisdictional contacts. See App. Br., p. 24. 
The Plaintiffs' argument should be rejected. The 
caselaw is uniform that the burden of establishing personal 
jurisdiction falls on the plaintiff, and Plaintiffs - quite 
tellingly -- cite not a single case holding otherwise. In 
addition, Plaintiffs' unsupported argument, if accepted, 
would turn Constitutional Due Process analysis on its head 
by requiring the court to determine liability under Section 
61-1-22(4) before deciding whether it has any jurisdiction 
9
 The Plaintiffs admit, as they must, that they have 
the burden of showing minimum contacts. See App. Br., p. 
32. 
Q i 
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over the defendants. Plaintiffs' approach makes no sense, 
whether from a legal or practical perspective. 
In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Pension Fund, the Court addressed at length the process by 
which courts determine personal jurisdiction: 
The [Plaintiffs'] argument that [personal 
jurisdiction] analysis changes where a 
federal statute premises liability on 
corporate affiliation ignores the process 
by which courts determine whether 
specific personal jurisdiction exists and 
confuses liability and jurisdiction. . 
If the court determines at the second 
step that a defendant does not have 
sufficient minimum contacts with the 
forum, then its personal jurisdiction 
analysis ends without examining the 
plaintiff's causes of action. The laws on 
which the suit are based would be 
irrelevant because a state or federal 
statute cannot transmogrify insufficient 
minimum contacts into a basis for 
personal jurisdiction by making these 
contacts elements of a cause of action, 
since this would violate due process 
(citations omitted). Similarly, 
jurisdiction and liability are two 
separate inquiries (citations omitted) . 
The fact that a defendant would be liable 
under a statute if personal jurisdiction 
over it could be obtained is irrelevant 
to the question of whether such 
jurisdiction can be exercised. 
230 F.3d at 944. The Plaintiffs' attempt to shift the 
burden is utterly antithetical to well-established due 
process considerations, which are designed to prohibit 
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prosecution of a cause of action against a defendant who 
lacks "minimum contacts" with the forum state. See 
Roskelley, 610 P.2d at 1310. Again, the trial court's 
order of dismissal must be affirmed. 
C. The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Canadian 
Defendants Would Be Constitutionally 
Unreasonable. 
In addition to the inadequate showing of minimum 
contacts between the Canadian Directors and the State of 
Utah, Plaintiffs have further failed to satisfy the second 
prong of the Due Process analysis: whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction would be "reasonable." Courts 
consider a number of factors to determine whether the 
exercise of jurisdiction is "reasonable": 
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the 
forum state's interest in adjudicating 
the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest 
in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief; (4) the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; 
and (5) the shared interest of the 
several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies. 
DeMoss, 762 F. Supp. at 919-20 (citations omitted). All of 
these factors weigh against the assertion of jurisdiction 
over the Canadian Directors. 
33 
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First, the burden of litigating in Utah would pose 
a severe burden to the Canadian Directors. All of the 
Canadian Directors are foreign citizens, and the "unique 
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a 
foreign legal system should have significant weight in 
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of 
personal jurisdiction over national borders." Asahi Metal, 
480 U.S. at 114; (RA 043, 047, 051). In a lawsuit that may 
require foreign nationals to submit themselves to a foreign 
judicial system, the plaintiffs face a "higher 
jurisdictional barrier" in asserting jurisdiction over the 
foreign defendants. Rano v. Sipa Press, 987 F.2d 580, 588 
(9th Cir. 1993); accord Parry v. Ernst Home Center Corp., 
779 P.2d 659, 662-63 (Utah 1989) (there are "important 
differences between assertions of jurisdiction in the 
interstate context and those in the international 
context"). However, consistent with their complete failure 
to conduct an individualized assessment of minimum 
contacts, Plaintiffs also fail to address the unique 
burdens facing the foreign-national Canadian Directors. 
In addition, Plaintiffs did not plead any facts 
evidencing that the Canadian Directors could "foresee" that 
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they would be haled into a Utah court. See Worldwide 
Volkswagon v. Woodson, 44 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
Plaintiffs' citation to a litany of "control person" 
statutes codified in other states does not suggest that the 
Canadian defendants could have foreseen that they would be 
sued in Utah - and certainly not by these Plaintiffs, none 
of whom even reside in Utah — for a bond issuance with 
which they had no personal involvement. App. Br., pp. 34-
35. 
Second, Utah's interest in adjudicating this 
lawsuit is slight. As noted above, the Canadian Directors 
have (and had) no substantial contacts with Utah, nor did 
they participate in the bond transactions at issue. 
Moreover, the company accused of violating securities laws 
LES (now known as Saf ety-Kleen) is a Delaware 
corporation, with its principal place of business at all 
relevant times in South Carolina. (RA 0178, 050). 
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Utah's interests in this 
action outweigh the interests held by the state of South 
Carolina with respect to the alleged improper conduct, or 
that the application of South Carolina law would compel an 
unjust result. In addition, none of the Plaintiffs in the 
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instant case is a Utah resident. (RA 021). Utah's 
interest in exercising personal jurisdiction is thus 
minimal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (Utah long-arm 
statute was intended to "provide its citizens with an 
effective means of redress against nonresident persons, 
who, through certain significant minimal contacts with this 
state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the 
state's protection.") (emphasis added). 
Third, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that 
they have any individual interest in having this dispute 
heard in Utah. Due process is concerned with the 
plaintiff's ability to obtain "convenient and effective" 
relief; it defies logic to think that it is "convenient" 
for the Plaintiffs — all large East Coast investment firms 
— to litigate their claims in Utah. DeMoss, 762 F. Supp. 
at 919-20. Plaintiffs are not Utah residents. (RA 021). 
The alleged accounting fraud occurred in South Carolina, 
not Utah. As Plaintiffs' choice of forum is not consistent 
with the concerns of "reasonability, " it should be entitled 
to little deference. 
Fourth, notions of judicial economy weigh heavily 
against the exercise of jurisdiction. The Canadian 
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Directors have appeared in no less than five securities 
class action lawsuits, four of which are currently being 
litigated in federal court in South Carolina with respect 
to the same accounting issues that Plaintiffs reference in 
their complaint.10 And, not surprisingly, the documents and 
witnesses relevant to the alleged fraud are located 
primarily in South Carolina - not Utah. Since Plaintiffs 
claims should properly have been brought in South Carolina, 
this Court should not encourage piecemeal litigation here. 
Finally, the fifth factor - the states' shared 
interest in furthering substantive policies - does not 
weigh in favor of asserting personal jurisdiction over the 
Canadian Directors. This lawsuit should properly have been 
pursued in a forum with sufficient personal jurisdiction, 
where contacts between the directors and the forum actually 
exist. Satisfying the constitutional concerns of due 
10
 The four active cases are In re Safety-Kleen 
Bondholders Litigation, 3:00-CV-1145-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); 
In re Safety-Kleen Shareholder Litigation, 3:00-CV-736-17 
(D.S.C.) Anderson, J.); and In re: Laidlaw Stockholder 
Litigation, 3:00-CV-855-17 (D.S.C.) (Anderson, J.); In re 
Safety-Kleen Rollins Shareholder Litigation, 3:00-CV-1343-
17 (Anderson, J.). Another case, In re Laidlaw Bondholder 
Litigation, has been settled. 3:00-CV-2518-17 (Anderson, 
J.) . 
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process, therefore, is the most significant policy 
consideration in this case. Plaintiffs' argument fails at 
every turn, and the trial court's order of dismissal should 
be affirmed. 
D. The Plaintiffs Have Failed to Show That the 
Canadian Directors Engaged in Any Contacts 
Enumerated in the Utah Long-Arm Statute. 
Plaintiffs' failure to meet the requirements of 
due process dooms their appeal. In addition, Plaintiffs 
have also failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements 
of the Utah long-arm statute. Section 78-27-22 limits 
Utah's exercise of personal jurisdiction to situations 
where the defendant has engaged in certain enumerated 
conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22; Harnischfeger, 883 
F.Supp. at 612-613. Plaintiffs claim that the Canadian 
Directors, by virtue of nothing more than their position as 
alleged controlling persons of LES, "transacted business" 
that had effects in Utah either personally or by way of an 
agent. See App. Br., p. 31. However, as discussed at 
length above, Plaintiffs are unable to muster any facts to 
support their jurisdictional claims. 
The "transaction of any business" requires "some 
substantial activity with some degree of continuity." 
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Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257, 1259 
(Utah 1976). However, as noted above, Plaintiffs cannot 
show that the Canadian Directors had any relevant contact 
whatsoever with the State of Utah. The only relevant 
evidence before this Court is contained in the 
uncontroverted sworn declarations of the Canadian 
Directors, which establish that these individuals did not 
participate in any way with the Bonds at issue in this 
case. 
Furthermore, the Canadian Directors have not 
engaged in any relevant conduct in Utah through an agent. 
An individual's status as a director does not make one, "as 
such, an agent of the corporation," Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 14C. Plaintiffs cite neither legal authority nor 
a factual basis to support their claim that LES, or its 
Chief Financial Officer Paul Humphreys, somehow acted as 
the agents of the individual directors for purposes of 
establishing personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' claim in 
this regard is further contradicted by the numerous cases 
distinguishing between corporations and their directors on 
jurisdictional matters. See Ten Mile Industrial Park, 810 
F.2d at 1524 (discussed supra); SII Megadiamond, Inc., 969 
on 
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P.2d at 437 (same). As Plaintiffs have utterly failed to 
adduce any contacts between the Canadian Directors and 
Utah, jurisdiction is improper under the Utah long-arm 
statute. 
E. Section 61-1-26, Which Provides for Substituted 
Service of Process, Is Not Sufficient To Permit 
the Exercise of Jurisdiction and is Trumped by Due 
Process Considerations. 
In their final effort to manufacture a basis for 
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs suggest that a service of process 
statute, which permits service upon a defendant through the 
Secretary of State if he cannot otherwise be served in 
Utah, somehow provides an independent basis for to justify 
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the 
Canadian Directors. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26/ App. Br., 
pp. 36-38. Plaintiffs' reliance upon Section 61-1-26 is 
misplaced. As previously noted with regard to Section 61-
1-22(4) (discussed supra), nothing within Section 61-1-26 
abrogates constitutional due process requirements or 
purports to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction. 
See Burger King Corp. All U.S. at 471-472. Instead, 
Section 61-1-26 merely states that if personal jurisdiction 
through the service of process cannot "otherwise be 
obtained in this State," a plaintiff may serve the 
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defendant with the complaint at the Office of the Secretary 
of State. Such statutes are commonplace and are intended 
to provide plaintiffs with a location of service when a 
defendant who is subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
State cannot be found within the forum; they do not provide 
an independent statutory basis for the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction itself. 
In making this argument, Plaintiffs confuse the 
requirement that there be a "basis of personal 
jurisdiction" with the "acquisition of personal 
jurisdiction." The constitution requires that the "basis" 
of personal jurisdiction be tied to specific minimum 
contacts and fairness. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. 
310. The "acquisition" of personal jurisdiction, on the 
other hand, is concerned with ensuring proper service of 
process upon those individuals for whom there is already an 
appropriate basis of jurisdiction. See Ziller Electronics 
Lab GmbH v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1229 
(Calif. 1988) ("Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant depends upon the existence of essentially two 
criteria: first, a basis for jurisdiction must exist due to 
defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state; second, 
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i 
given that basis for jurisdiction, jurisdiction must be 
acquired by service of process in strict compliance with i 
the requirements of our service statutes."); cf. Rudd v. 
Crown International, 488 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1971) 
i 
("Defendant concedes that under the long-arm statute its 
activities within the state are sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction upon the courts . . . The dispute concerns the 
method of serving process."). 
Predictably, Plaintiffs do not address this 
precedent. Instead, they cite to two out-of-state cases 
that do not stand for the proposition pushed on this Court: 
American Microtel, Inc. v. Massachusetts, 1995 WL 809575 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 1995) (hereafter American 
Microtel), and Brown v. Investment Mgmt. and Research, 
Inc., 475 S.E.2d 754 (S.C. 1996) (hereafter Brown) . (App. 
Br., pp. 34-35). Plaintiffs attempt to mislead the court 
by asserting that American Microtel is "directly on point." 
App. Br., p. 37. The American Microtel court explicitly 
noted that it was not considering the "exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a court/' but was in fact concerned with 
whether the Director of Massachusetts' Securities Division 
had the power to impose sanctions in an administrative 
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proceeding. American Microtel, supra, 1995 WL 809575 at 
*11 (emphasis added). Although the court indicated in 
dicta in a footnote that the long-arm statute might 
hypothetically supply personal jurisdiction, the 
Massachusetts court certainly did not suggest that the 
constitutionally-mandated "minimum contacts" test would 
become irrelevant in those circumstances. Id. at *11 n.8. 
The Brown decision is also inapposite. As an 
initial matter, the Brown court unambiguously and 
intentionally disregarded due process considerations. 475 
S.E. 2d at 758, fn. 6 (" [r]espondents . . . also argue that 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over them would 
violate federal standards of due process. The trial judge 
specifically declined to address this issue in his order. 
Therefore, any due process objections are more properly 
addressed by the trial court on remand"). In any event, 
the court found that the South Carolina long-arm statute 
supplied jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant personally engaged in fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentations. Brown, 475 S.E.2d at 756-57. After 
ascertaining that the court already had jurisdiction under 
the long-arm statute, the court noted that the South 
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Carolina service of process statute would also permit the 
exercise of jurisdiction when the defendants, "by their < 
actions," agreed to submit to jurisdiction. Id. at 757, 
By contrast, Plaintiffs here have alleged that the Canadian 
defendants are subject to jurisdiction merely by virtue of 
their status as outside directors of LES - a basis which 
the trial court correctly ruled was insufficient as a 
matter of law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court 
properly dismissed the complaint against defendants John R. 
Grainger, James R. Bullock, and Leslie W. Haworth. The 
ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Dated: June 24, 2003 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ ^ — 
Andrew Deiss 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellants 
Bullock, Grainger & Haworth 
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ADDENDUM A 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies — 
Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 
61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under 
Section 61-1-15.. which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature 
before it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 
61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of Subsec-
tion 61-1-1(2) is liable 10 the person selling the security to or buying the 
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 12% per year 
from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the 
security or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender 
less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at 
12% per year from the date of disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount 
equal to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest, costs,- and attorney's fees: less any amounts, all as specified in 
Subsection (1) upon a showing that the violation was .reckless or intentional. 
(3) A person wTho offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) 
is not liable under Subsection (l)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or 
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission. 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer 
liable under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a 
seller or buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially 
aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who 
materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to 
the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or 
nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable. 
(5) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before 
entry of judgment. 
' (6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of any person who 
might have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this 
section unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or 
transaction constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after 
the discover/ by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, 
whichever expires first. 
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61-1-22 cont. 
(b) No person may sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a 
time when he owned the security, to refund the consideration paid 
together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, less 
the amount of any income received on the security, and he failed to 
accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a 
time when he did not own the security, unless he rejected the offer in 
writing within 30 days of its receipt. 
(8) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract 
in violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired 
any purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the facts by 
reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit 
on the contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a 
security to waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order hereunder is 
void. 
(10) (a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to 
any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this 
section or Subsection 61-1-4(6). 
61-1-26. Scope of the act — Service of process, 
(1) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), Sections 61-1-7, 61-1-15.5, 61-1-17, 
and 61-1-22.apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when: 
(a) an offer to sell is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state. 
(2) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), and Section 61-1-17 apply to 
persons who buy or offer to buy when: 
(a) an offer to buy is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to sell is made and accepted in this state. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this 
state whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer: 
(a) originates from this state; or 
(b) is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to 
which it is directed, or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed 
offer. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is accepted in 
this state when acceptance: 
(a) is communicated to the offeror in this state; and 
(b) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in 
writing, outside this state, and acceptance is communicated to the offeror 
in this state, whether or not either party is then present in this state, 
when the offeree directs it to the offeror in this state reasonably believing 
the offeror to be in this state and it is received at the place to which it is 
directed or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed 
acceptance. 
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when: 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this 
state any bona fide newspaper or other publication of general, regular, and 
paid circulation which is not published in this state, or which is published 
in this state but has had more than % of its circulation outside this state 
during the past 12 months; or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside this state is 
received in this state. 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as Section 61-1-17 so far 
as investment advisers are concerned, apply when any act instrumental in 
effecting prohibited conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party 
is then present in this state. 
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61-1-26 cont. 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chapter and every 
issuer which proposes to offer a security in this state through any person 
acting on an agency basis in the common-law sense shall file with the 
division, in such form as it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent 
appointing the division or the director to be his attorney to receive service 
of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor, executor, or administrator which arises, 
under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder after the consent has 
been filed, with the same force and validity as if served personally on the 
person filing the consent. 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection with a previous 
registration or notice filing need not file another. 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of. 
the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the 
division in a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or 
respondent at his last address on file with the division, and the plaintiff's 
affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed in the case on or before 
the return day of the process, if any, or within such further time as the 
court allows. 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in 
conduct prohibited or made actionable by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of process under 
Subsection (7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be 
obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his 
appointment of the division or the director to be his attorney to receive 
service of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor executor or administrator which grows out of 
that conduct and which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order 
' hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on him personally, 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of 
the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the 
division in a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or 
respondent at his last-known address or takes other steps which are 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of 
compliance with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the return 
day of the process, if any, or within such further time as the court allows. 
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or the director shall 
order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant or 
respondent reasonable opportunity to defend. 
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